Usability and security of gaze-based graphical grid passwords by Arianezhad, Majid et al.
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Arianezhad, Majid, Stebila, Douglas, & Mozaffari, Behzad (2013) Usability
and security of gaze-based graphical grid passwords. In Adams, Andrew
& Murata, Kiyoshi (Eds.) 2013 Workshop on Usable Security (USEC), 1
April 2013, Okinawa, Japan. (In Press)
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/58524/
c© Copyright 2013 [please consult the author]
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
Usability and Security of Gaze-Based
Graphical Grid Passwords
Majid Arianezhad1, Douglas Stebila2, and Behzad Mozaffari2
1 School of Engineering Science, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., Canada;
arianezhad@sfu.ca
2 Science and Engineering Faculty, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane,
Australia; stebila@qut.edu.au, behzad.mozaffari@connect.qut.edu.au
Abstract. We present and analyze several gaze-based graphical pass-
word schemes based on recall and cued-recall of grid points; eye-trackers
are used to record user’s gazes, which can prevent shoulder-surfing and
may be suitable for users with disabilities. Our 22-subject study ob-
serves that success rate and entry time for the grid-based schemes we
consider are comparable to other gaze-based graphical password schemes.
We propose the first password security metrics suitable for analysis of
graphical grid passwords and provide an in-depth security analysis of
user-generated passwords from our study, observing that, on several met-
rics, user-generated graphical grid passwords are substantially weaker
than uniformly random passwords, despite our attempts at designing
schemes to improve quality of user-generated passwords.
Keywords: graphical passwords; eye-tracking; usable security
1 Introduction
Graphical password schemes have the potential to improve user authentication
due to easier memorability and use. Typically, a user indicates various regions of
the screen or draws some pattern using mouse, touch, or gaze input methods.
Gaze-based password input is promising due to its resistance to shoulder surfing
and because it may be easier for people with disabilities to use. The usability
of graphical password has been extensively studied, but there has been very
little investigation into the quality of user-generated graphical passwords. We
investigate several variants of graphical grid passwords to determine if variations
can improve the quality of user-generated passwords—in terms of point and
stroke distribution and symmetry—while maintaining usability
An extensive survey of the vast literature on graphical passwords was recently
given by Biddle, Chiasson, and van Oorschot [4]. They describe three main
categories of schemes: recall-based schemes, such as Draw-A-Secret [14], where the
user must recall and enter a secret drawing or pattern from memory; recognition-
based schemes, where a user must recognize a few personal objects from a set
of objects, either images (Passfaces [20], Faces [7]) or text [28]; and cued-recall
schemes, such as PassPoints [24,25] or Cued Gaze-Points [12], where the user is
given an image cue and must recall and enter certain points or a pattern.
Recall-based schemes can be divided into two main subcategories. In free-form
drawmetric schemes, such as Draw-A-Secret [14] or Pass-Go [23], the user draws
an arbitrary image on a blank canvas. Grid schemes restrict the valid target points
to a grid; some, such as PassShapes [26] and the gaze-based EyePassShapes [8],
restrict moves to adjacent points in the grid or use limited patterns [10], whereas
others, such as GridSure [5] and the popular ‘pattern lock’ 3 × 3 grid screens
for Android and other [22] mobile phones allow users to enter arbitrary patterns
of grid points. A few schemes [15] have users enter text-based passwords using
on-screen keyboards.
Shoulder-surfing, where an attacker watches a user enter their password, is
a well-known problem for graphical password schemes [11,29]. Grid schemes on
mobile phones can be vulnerable to smudge attacks [3], though shoulder-surfing
and smudge attacks can be mitigated using biometric characteristics from entering
the password [9]. Magnetic entry schemes also resist shoulder-surfing attack [21].
Gaze-based passwords may be more resistant to such attacks, since no visual
feedback of the user’s entry is displayed on-screen, and may also be suitable as
an input method for users with disabilities. (Gaze-based entry is not a security
panacea, however: video cameras or attackers surreptitiously watching a user’s
eye movement may still be able to gain enough information to attack passwords
with some success [8].)
A well-known weakness of traditional text-based passwords is that human-
generated passwords are not truly random. While an eight-character mixed-case
alphanumeric password may be chosen from a large theoretical password space
((26 + 26 + 10)8 = 628 ≈ 247.6), humans pick passwords from a non-uniform
distribution with much lower entropy.
Unfortunately, most papers on graphical password schemes only mention the
theoretical password space with no analysis of user-generated passwords, though
some research has been done on the password security of some schemes. A line of
research by van Oorschot and Thorpe has analysed the space of human-generated
passwords in free-form drawmetric schemes [18] as well as the prevalence of
image hot spots in cued-recall graphical passwords [17,19], though hot spots can
be reduced using masking [6]. User-generated passwords in recognition-based
schemes can also have poor entropy and be susceptible to educated guess attacks
based on demographic information [7] or personal knowledge [13].
We focus on recall-based graphical grid schemes using eye-tracking for data
entry. From the usability perspective, we aim to determine if gaze-based entry
of graphical grid passwords, which have no recall cues, can achieve comparable
success rates and entry times to cued-recall schemes. On the security side, we aim
to provide metrics for the security of human-generated grid passwords, as previous
security analyses do not directly carry over to grid schemes. We hypothesize that
human-generated passwords will have more symmetry and not use uniformly
distributed points and strokes, so we test several variants to see if they improve
password quality.
2 Schemes
In a pre-trial phase, we had a handful of users try out a basic grid scheme, and
noticed that the passwords they created tended to being symmetric and have
poor distribution of the first and last points; in particular, a significant proportion
of users chose the top-left point as their first point. Pre-study results were similar
to the results for Scheme 1; see Appendix B for distribution of points during
the main study. This motivated us to design several variants to see if we could
improve the quality of user-generated passwords.
We propose four gaze-based graphical grid password schemes as shown in
Figure 1. Scheme 1 is a basic 5 × 4 grid, a generalization of the ‘pattern lock’
screen popular on Android devices. In Scheme 2, we cued the user to start and
end at the specified points, visually displayed with different colours; by picking
the first point for the user, we hypothesize that the second point (i.e., the first
user-selected point) might have better distribution; this also eliminates perfectly
symmetric shapes that use the same start and end point. In Scheme 3, we removed
a few random grid points: users may be less likely to pick symmetric shapes since
not all the points were available to them. We also wanted to know if a bigger,
sparser, less grid-like scheme induced more random passwords: Scheme 4 was a
much sparser subset of a larger, 6x6 grid. Note that while we designed schemes 2
through 4 by selecting/removing points at random, we did this randomization
once: all users used the exact same fixed grids in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Gaze-based graphical grid password schemes in our study
To enter passwords, users gaze at the first point in the password, press the
space bar to tell the system to begin recording, gaze at each subsequent point
for at least 0.5 seconds, then press the space bar again to stop recording. Note in
particular that users do not have to press the space bar at each point, just gaze
at it for at least 0.5 seconds. No visual feedback is displayed to the user while
entering their password — no indicated of points gazed or even when a gaze
is registered; the only visual feedback comes after they press the space bar to
stop recording, which results in a dialog box indicating successful or failed entry.
Subsequent points have no restriction for adjacency; the same point cannot be
gazed at twice in a row, though can be later used again.
The entry grid was displayed on a 19” monitor running at a resolution of
1920× 1080 pixels. Gaze points were displayed as circles of radius 65 pixels with
a 11× 11 pixel ‘cross’ (+) displayed in the centre of the circle to help users focus
on a target. The user did not need to gaze directly at the circle: we took the
closest circle to their gaze fixation.
3 Experiment Design
We conducted a within-subjects lab study. Participants were approached through
personal contacts and received no compensation; the study was approved by the
university’s ethics board.
A standard Windows 7 desktop PC with a 19” monitor was equipped with
a Mirametrix S2 Eye Tracker, placed just below the monitor. The device has a
data rate of 60 Hz with infrared binocular tracking. The accuracy range is 0.5◦
to 1◦ and the drift range is less than 0.3◦. Our gaze-based password scheme was
a custom-written C# program.
Each participant was assigned to use three of the four schemes: all participants
used Schemes 1 and 2, and were randomly assigned to either Scheme 3 or 4. First,
participants were introduced to the system and ran the eye-tracker’s 9-point
calibration routine. We told users to gaze at points for at least 1 second, even
though the system would register a gaze after just 0.5 seconds. For each of the
three schemes assigned (1, then 2, then either 3 or 4) participants were directed
to (a) create a new password “of at least 6 points that would be easy for [them]
to remember but hard for others to guess”; (b) confirm the password; (c) answer
three short survey questions3; and (d) login using the password. After doing this
for the three assigned schemes, the participant did (e) a final login using the
password from Scheme 1. During confirmation and login sub-tasks, participants
could keep trying until successful, skip the task, or restart the task (recreate and
reconfirm a new password).
The login (d) after sub-task (c) and the final login at the end were designed
to test recall after a passage of time. The login (d) after distraction task (c)
typically occurred approximately 1 minute after completing steps (a)–(b). This
is similar to the 30-second distraction task of Forget et al. [12].
The final login (e) in Scheme 1 typically occurred approximately 10 minutes
after completing steps (a)–(d) for Scheme 1. In fact, in our study we also emailed
participants two days after their participation, asking them to reply with the
scheme 1 password, but not enough participants responded for us to report
results.
It should be noted that, by having all subjects proceed sequentially through
the tasks, a potential learning effect is introduced in which users find the later
schemes easier to use: thus usability results may not be fully comparable between
schemes. However, studies have found that security behaviour can change if the
user has been “primed” for security (for example, Whalen and Inkpen [27] found
3 Survey questions in Appendix A. User password dataset and Java code for metrics
available at http://eprints.qut.edu.au/58524/
that no users looked for web browser security indicators before being asked to
do so). In our context, this means that a user who sees scheme 2 before scheme
1 may choose different start/end points in scheme 1 than had she seen scheme
1 before scheme 2. To compare password quality consistently across schemes
and to avoid priming subjects to choose more random or asymmetric passwords
in scheme 1, we used a fixed sequence of tasks. This tradeoff between learning
effects in usability or in password security seems to be inherent to any study
where subjects use multiple variants.
Participants were randomly assigned to either scheme 3 or scheme 4 before
they arrived; time constraints prevented us from having participants use both
schemes.
Some of our survey questions, regarding security and computer expertise, are
a subset of the survey questions of Arianezhad et al. [2].
4 Results
We had 25 participants total, though the eye-tracking equipment only recorded
results for 22 of them due to astigmatisms. Participants ranged in age from 19–41
with an average age of 26.1. Most had a high degree of computer expertise; only
1 reported using Android pattern lock.
To help the reader understand what types of passwords are entered by users,
we include in Appendix C the points for the passwords entered by our users in
Scheme 1.
4.1 Security
Since passwords in our scheme are user-generated, not randomly generated, it is
not appropriate to assume that all possible passwords are equally likely. Table 1
reports several measures of password randomness; cells in sections (b)–(d) of the
table are of the form a/b, where a is the value of the metric for passwords our
users created and b is the value for passwords generated uniformly at random,
computed either algebraically (for (b)) or on a sample of 100000 passwords of
length 7 generated uniformly at random (for (c) and (d)).
Password length. Users were directed to create a new password “of at least 6
points that would be easy for [them] to remember but hard for others to guess”.
As reported in Table 1, the average length of passwords in all schemes around
71/3 characters. Note that in Scheme 2, users seemed to interpret this instruction
for length of at least 6 as including the cued start and end points, hence in the
table we report only the number of user-selected—and hence secret—points.
Point frequency. For all four schemes, the frequency of points selected by users
is quite close to random: for example, in Scheme 1, the entropy of user-selected
points is 4.11 bits, compared to the maximum 4.32 bits for random points.
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4
Grid Grid with Grid with Sparse grid
cued start/end holes
(a) User-generated password length
Mean∗ (SD) 7.59 (2.42) 5.36 (2.01) 7.33 (2.69) 7.23 (1.64)
(b) Binary entropy of points
All 4.11/4.32 3.87/4.17 3.75/4.00 3.95/4.00
First† 2.18/4.32 2.54/4.25 2.50/4.00 2.78/4.00
Last† 3.54/4.32 2.63/4.25 2.50/4.00 2.14/4.00
(c) Binary entropy of stroke direction & length‡
3.47/5.65 3.05/5.54 3.20/5.64 3.73/6.33
(d) Symmetry score‡ (higher = more symmetry)
Vertical 0.71/0.58 0.70/0.55 0.66/0.57 0.48/0.47
Horizontal 0.66/0.57 0.68/0.59 0.63/0.56 0.43/0.46
(e) Search estimate for 7-point passwords
Theoretical 230.2 229.4 228.0 228.0
Point entropy 228.8 227.1 226.3 227.7
First+strokes 223.0 220.8 221.7 225.2
Table 1. Security metrics for user-generated passwords versus uniformly random
passwords
∗ For Scheme 2: excluding cued start/end points.
† First & last user-selected points. Thus, for Scheme 2: second & second-last.
‡ Values for uniformly random passwords calculated from 100000 uniformly randomly
generated samples of length 7.
However, first and last user-selected points are not very random. In Scheme
1, the entropy of user-selected first points was just 2.18 out of 4.32 bits; in fact
50% of user-generated passwords started in the top-left corner. Scheme 2 was
no better: the second and second-last points (i.e., the first and last user-selected
points) were clustered around the cued points and had low entropy (2.54 and
2.63 out of 4.25 bits). Frequency tables for all, first, and last points of all schemes
are given in Appendix B.
Strokes. We next consider the distribution of “strokes”, meaning the direction
and length between subsequent points. For example, a password where the
first point was (1, 1) and the second point was (2, 3) corresponds to the stroke
(1 ↓, 2→). We observed that the entropy of strokes in user-generated passwords
is quite poor, in all cases between 55% and 62% of the entropy of strokes in
randomly generated passwords. Frequency tables for stroke distribution for all
schemes are given in Appendix B.
Symmetry. We observed that many users entered passwords that looked to be
quite symmetric. For example, consider the fifth password (second row, second
column) in Appendix C that was entered by participant #5 entered in Scheme 1.
We devised a metric to measure the symmetry present in a graphical grid pass-
word based in part on symmetry analyses of free-form drawmetric schemes [16,18].
The vertical (respectively, horizontal) symmetry score is computed as follows:
for each possible vertical (horizontal) axis (axes exist either in between or along
columns (rows) of points), fold along the axis, count the number of password
points that match on both sides of the fold, and divide by the total number
of password points; the vertical (horizontal) symmetry score is the maximum
over all possible axes. (Note that both previous works on symmetry analyses of
drawmetric schemes include at least some off-centre axes [16] or maximize over
all possible axes [18].)
For example, for the firth password in Appendix C, the vertical symmetry
score is 1.0, since by folding along the optimal vertical axis (through the third
column), we have perfect overlap, whereas the horizontal symmetry score is
7/8 = 0.875, since by folding along the optimal horizontal axis (through the
second row), we have 7 of 8 points overlapping.
Note that although schemes 2–4 are somewhat asymmetric by design, the
symmetry score does not become obsolete. Rather, the question becomes: are user-
generated passwords more or less symmetric that randomly generated passwords
in the same scheme?
As seen in Table 1(d) Schemes 1, 2, and 3 had higher vertical and horizontal
symmetry scores than randomly generated passwords, suggesting that Schemes 2
and 3 did not introduce much “asymmetry”. However, user-generated passwords
in Scheme 4 were as asymmetric as random passwords.
Password space estimate. We used the above password metrics to estimate
an upper-bound on the amount of work to search for a 7-point password using
three different strategies: the theoretical search space (computed as 7 · (ideal
entropy of all points)); based on the point entropy of user-generated passwords
(7 · (user entropy of all points)); and first+strokes, based on the entropy of the
first point and subsequent strokes of user-generated passwords ((user entropy of
1st point) + 6 · (user entropy of strokes)). For Schemes 1–3, these techniques show
decreases in search space of at least 7 bits compared to the theoretical space.
Limitations. The symmetry measures we employ do not address rotational
symmetry or reflection on non-vertical/horizontal axes. While such symmetries
are natural [16] for free-form drawmetric schemes, it is not clear how to correctly
define them for grid schemes.
4.2 Usability
Table 2 (following reporting techniques of Forget et al. [12]) reports a wide variety
of metrics on the usability of our 4 schemes and compares with 3 other gaze-based
schemes. We use non-parametric tests due to small sample size.
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Successes and errors. As described in Table 2, the mean number of password
creation operations per participant in Scheme 1 was (mostly) significantly smaller
than Schemes 2 (Wilcoxon signed-rank V = 3, p = 0.037), 3 (V = 0, p = 0.098),
and 4 (V = 0, p = 0.034). Scheme 1 also required fewer tries for confirmation,
but the difference was significant only versus Scheme 4 (V = 0, p = 0.021).
For number of tries for successful login after the short distraction task (3
survey questions, ∼45 seconds), Schemes 1, 2, and 3 all performed well, and better
than Scheme 4, though the difference was not statistically significant. However,
the success rate for final logins to Scheme 1, which participants did at the end of
the study after doing the Scheme 2 and Scheme 3 or 4 tasks (∼10 minutes later),
was quite poor (≤ 3 tries: 55%). This suggests users may forget grid passwords
quickly, may become confounded when working with several grid passwords, or
did not have enough repetition to ensure memorability. Our recall rate is not far
off that of EyePassShapes [8], though theirs was after a much longer period (5
days vs. ∼10 minutes). A Spearman rank correlation test observed no statistically
significant correlation between password length and number of confirmation or
login errors.
Times. Table 2 reports for creation, confirmation, and login. Note that we report
two different types of times:
– total time required for creation, confirmation, or login, which includes time
elapsed during errors and re-tries, but does not include eye-tracker calibration
– time per point for successful creation, confirmation, or login, which includes
only the time elapsed during the entry that actually succeeded, and is averaged
on a per point basis.
We report both times to allow meaningful comparison with other schemes, some
of which (Cued Gaze Points (CGP) T-51) reported total time and some of which
(EyePassShapes, EyePassword) reported successful time. Note CGP T-51 [12]
times also include time for a 1-point calibration and keyboard-based username
entry; all other times do not include calibration or username entry. At the start of
the study, we used our device manufacturer’s 9-point calibration, which requires
∼20 seconds.
Times required for Schemes 1, 2, and 3 were fairly similar, whereas Scheme
4 had higher creation and confirmation times. Due to high standard deviation,
only a few of the differences in means were statistically significant: creation time,
Scheme 1 vs. 4 (Wilcoxon signed-rank V = 16, p = 0.043); confirmation time,
Scheme 1 vs. 2 (V = 63, p = 0.041) and 1 vs. 4 (V = 6, p = 0.006).
Since we allowed users to choose the length of their password, we separately
report times for just the successful creation/confirmation/login operations, aver-
aged over the number of points in the password. Mean time per point is relatively
consistent across all schemes and tasks: on average, users require 1.77 seconds
per spot. Hence, an experienced user who makes no errors should be able to login
with a 7-point password in around 12 seconds or less.
Our times are generally comparable with other schemes. In particular, per-
point time during successful logins (ranging from 1.26–1.98 seconds per point) is
on par with that for EyePassShapes (1.56 seconds), although a bit higher than
EyePassword (1.08 seconds per point).
User perception. For each scheme, participants rated “how difficult it was to
complete the task” on a 4-point Likert scale (very easy, easy, hard, very hard).
Nearly all participants rated Schemes 1 and 2 easy or very easy (slightly lower
than Cued Gaze-Points [12]; higher than EyePassShapes [8]), but only about half
did for Schemes 3 and 4.
5 Conclusion
We have studied the usability and security of various recall-based graphical grid
password schemes when used with gaze-based user interfaces. Though it can
be difficult to precisely compare usability results across studies, in general our
success rates and entry times are comparable with existing gaze-based cued-
recall schemes. We give the first thorough treatment of the quality of passwords
generated by users in graphical grid password schemes.
Assessing the strength of user-generated passwords on a variety of metrics is
essential. User-generated graphical passwords may perform well on some metrics
but poorly on others. Thus, for user-generated passwords, a simple password-
space calculation in which all potential passwords are considered equally likely is
overly optimistic. We have proposed the first metrics for assessing randomness
of grid password schemes, which can be applied to all grid schemes, including
for example Android pattern lock. In all of our schemes, the distribution of the
first and last user- points was quite poor. The distribution of strokes between
subsequent points in a password was also quite poor. Our attempt in Scheme
4 at increasing asymmetry in user-generated passwords worked, but at the cost
of significantly longer creation and confirmation time and significantly lower
confirmation and login success rates. Of the four schemes we proposed, the basic
grid scheme, Scheme 1, seems to provide the best ease-of-use (high success rates,
small time), with password distribution quality comparable to the other schemes.
Larger-scale real-world studies testing gaze-based graphical grid password
scheme would provide insight into several open questions, such as the usability
of gaze-based authentication in a non-laboratory setting, generalization to other
user populations, suitability for users with disabilities, long-term recall rates,
whether use of multiple grid passwords has a confounding effect, and the relative
security of human-generated grid passwords in settings with more realistic risks.
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A Survey
[In the survey questions reproduced below, we use to indicate that the question
allowed a free-form answer, © to indicate that a single choice could be made, and 
to indicate that multiple choices could be made. Participants completed questions 1–4
during the distraction during Scheme 1, questions 5–8 during the distractions during
Scheme 2, questions 9–12 during the distractions during Scheme 3 or 4, and questions
13–16 at the end of the study.]
You can skip any questions you prefer not to answer.
1. What is your participant number?
2. What is your age?
3. What is your gender?
© Male © Female © Prefer not to say
4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
© Some high school
© High school diploma
© TAFE diploma4
© Some university education
© Bachelor’s degree
© Master’s degree
© Doctoral degree
© Other
5. Are you currently a student?
© Yes © No
If yes, what are your year and major?
6. Are you currently employed?
© Yes © No
If yes, what is your occupation?
7. Do you use a computer daily for work?
© Yes © No
8. Do you have a degree in OR are currently studying toward a degree in an IT-related
field (e.g., information technology, computer science, electrical engineering, etc.)?
© Yes © No
9. Have you ever (select all that apply)
 Designed a website
 Registered a domain name
 Used SSH
 Configured a firewall
 Created a database
 Installed a computer program
 Written a computer program
 None of the above
10. Have you ever taken or taught a course on computer security?
© Yes © No
11. Please check all of the following statements that describe your password habits.
 I use the same password for every website.
 I have a few passwords that I use interchangeably.
 I have one password that I use for important sites and another password I use
for less important sites.
 I use different passwords for each site.
 I use my web browser’s password manager to store my passwords.
 I write my passwords down on a piece of paper.
 I use a separate program to store my passwords.
12. Please specify the brand and model of your mobile phone.
13. If you have an iPhone, which of the following options best describes your passcode
lock habits?
 I have set a numerical passcode to lock/unlock my iPhone
4 [In Australia, TAFE stands for Technical and Further Education, and such institutions
typically offer vocational tertiary education courses.]
 I have installed a third-party application to simulate Android grid lock screen
on my iPhone
 I have no lock screen setting on my iPhone
 I don’t have an iPhone
14. If your mobile supports Android, which of the following options best describes your
lock screen habits?
 I have set a numerical passcode to lock/unlock my mobile
 I use grid lock screen on my mobile phone
 I have no lock screen setting on my mobile phone
 I don’t use an Android mobile phone
15. Please rate each task in the study based on how difficult it was to complete the
task (1=very easy, 2=easy, 3=hard, 4=very hard).
(a) T1: Creating password in a grid.
(b) T2: Creating password in a grid with start and end points.
(c) T3: Creating password in a grid with holes, if you did this task.
(d) T4: Creating password in an asymmetric screen, if you did this task.
16. After completing these tasks, would you use this password scheme if your computer
was equipped with an eye-tracking device?
© Yes © No
Why or why not?
B Frequency Tables
B.1 Scheme 1: Grid
Scheme 1: All points
0.0719 0.0479 0.0838 0.0599 0.0599
0.0539 0.0778 0.0958 0.0599 0.0479
0.0060 0.0479 0.0838 0.0539 0.0299
0.0060 0.0240 0.0419 0.0299 0.0180
Scheme 1: First point
0.5000 0.1818 0.0455 0.0000 0.0455
0.0909 0.0455 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0909 0.0000 0.0000
Scheme 1: Last point
0.0455 0.0000 0.0000 0.1364 0.1364
0.0455 0.0455 0.0000 0.0455 0.0455
0.0000 0.0000 0.0909 0.0909 0.0000
0.0000 0.0455 0.0909 0.0455 0.1364
Scheme 1: Stroke frequency
4← 3← 2← 1← 1→ 2→ 3→ 4→
3 ↑ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 ↑ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0207 0.0000 0.0069 0.0069 0.0000
1 ↑ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0069 0.0207 0.0690 0.0345 0.0000 0.0069 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0138 0.1310 0.0000 0.2276 0.0069 0.0000 0.0000
1 ↓ 0.0000 0.0138 0.0276 0.0276 0.2414 0.0621 0.0138 0.0138 0.0000
2 ↓ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0069 0.0069 0.0138 0.0069 0.0000 0.0000
3 ↓ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0138 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
B.2 Scheme 2: Grid with cued start/end
Scheme 2: All points
0.0085 0.0932 0.0508 0.0593 0.0169
0.0000 0.1017 0.1186 0.1017 0.0424
0.0085 0.1017 0.1102 0.0254 0.0424
0.0085 0.0254 0.0254 0.0254 0.0339
Scheme 2: Second point
0.0455 0.2273 0.0000 0.0000 0.0455
0.0000 0.4091 0.0455 0.0000 0.0455
0.0455 0.0909 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0455 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Scheme 2: Second last point
0.0000 0.0000 0.0455 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0455 0.3636 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.2273 0.0455 0.0455
0.0000 0.0455 0.0455 0.1364 0.0000
Scheme 2: Stroke frequency
4← 3← 2← 1← 1→ 2→ 3→ 4→
3 ↑ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 ↑ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1 ↑ 0.0000 0.0071 0.0071 0.0143 0.0357 0.0286 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0071 0.0929 0.0000 0.2357 0.0000 0.0214 0.0000
1 ↓ 0.0000 0.0214 0.0071 0.0643 0.3357 0.0643 0.0286 0.0000 0.0000
2 ↓ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0071 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3 ↓ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
B.3 Scheme 3: Grid with holes
Scheme 3: All points
0.0455 0.0303 0.0758 0.0303 0.0455
0.0455 0.0152 0.0455 0.0303
0.1061 0.1515 0.1061 0.0303
0.1212 0.0758 0.0455
Scheme 3: First point
0.2222 0.1111 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1111 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.2222 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1111 0.0000 0.2222
Scheme 3: Last point
0.0000 0.0000 0.1111 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2222
0.0000 0.2222 0.1111 0.0000
0.2222 0.1111 0.0000
Scheme 3: Stroke frequency
4← 3← 2← 1← 1→ 2→ 3→ 4→
3 ↑ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
2 ↑ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1 ↑ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0877 0.0877 0.0526 0.0175 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1579 0.0000 0.1754 0.0175 0.0000 0.0000
1 ↓ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000 0.2632 0.0175 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 ↓ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0351 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3 ↓ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
B.4 Scheme 4: Sparse grid
Scheme 4: All points
0.0532 0.1064 0.0000
0.0532 0.1064 0.0000
0.0745 0.0957 0.0000
0.0426 0.0851
0.0213 0.0213
0.0000 0.0000 0.0426
Scheme 4: First point
0.0769 0.0000 0.0000
0.3077 0.0769 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Scheme 4: Last point
0.0000 0.0769 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0769 0.0769
0.0000 0.0769
0.0000 0.0000 0.2308
Scheme 4: Stroke frequency
5← 4← 3← 2← 1← 1→ 2→ 3→ 4→ 5→
5 ↑ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
4 ↑ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3 ↑ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0123
2 ↑ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1 ↑ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0370 0.0370 0.0000 0.0864 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0123 0.0370 0.0247 0.0000 0.0617 0.0370 0.0123 0.0247 0.0000
1 ↓ 0.0123 0.0000 0.0123 0.0123 0.2840 0.0370 0.0741 0.1111 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 ↓ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0247 0.0000 0.0123 0.0247 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3 ↓ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
4 ↓ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
5 ↓ 0.0000 0.0123 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
C Sample User-Generated Passwords — Scheme 1
